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ABSTRACT
Too many authorities view the transfer of patented self-replicating
technology (SRT) as either a pure license or a pure sale. If a pure license exists,
the patentee can impose post-transfer restrictions on the product’s use, frustrating
the policy goals of limited monopoly and free alienability of chattels. If a pure sale
is triggered, however, the patentee loses all rights through patent exhaustion,
allowing the purchaser to replicate the chattel at will. Sensitive to this latter
argument, several courts have enforced Monsanto Company’s “bag tag” seed
licenses, which require Monsanto’s farmer customers to destroy all secondgeneration seed. Urging a middle path, this Note argues that the conveyance of
SRT to an end-user must sever the patentee’s control over the chattel’s use. At the
same time, the patentee remains entitled to a reasonable royalty on future
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replications of the product. This Note explores the doctrinal and policy benefits of
such a reform.
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent exhaustion, the rule that a patentee loses rights in a patent-practicing
good upon its authorized sale to a consumer, is tormented by uncertainty when the
good can self-replicate. The trouble arises because the rationale for patent
exhaustion is that, once a user owns the chattel, that user’s interest in free
alienation of personal property outweighs the patentee’s interest in further
recouping the investment. 1 In addition, many scholars and judges view post-sale
restrictions on use as straying outside the scope of the patent grant, violating the
Patent Act’s goals of limited monopoly. 2 When the conveyed chattel can selfreplicate, however, a risk arises that the consumer will remake the good,
prejudicing the patent’s value. Such risk, many argue, heightens the patentee’s
interest in policing the purchaser’s exploitation of the chattel’s self-replicating
qualities. 3 An example of the phenomena is Monsanto Company’s (“Mansanto”)
licensing of genetically modified, patent-embodying seeds, chattel that by its
nature self-replicates. Monsanto requires its farmer customers to become
Monsanto “licensees” and perpetually restricts the farmers’ ability to replicate the
seeds. Three jurisdictions have upheld such licenses, ruling that the conveyance of
Monsanto-licensed seed to a farmer did not trigger patent exhaustion. 4
Notwithstanding, the current exhaustion law is ill-equipped to balance the equities
between patentee and user when self-replicating technology (SRT) is involved:
courts either invalidate the post-transfer restrictions and jeopardize the patent’s
value, 5 or enforce the restrictions and effectively gut the exhaustion rule. 6 One
solution in the Monsanto context is to invalidate the licensing as a tying in
violation of antitrust law; a note by Tempe Smith investigates how Monsanto could
avoid this antitrust liability. 7 Smith concludes that Monsanto must allow farmers
to plant replicated seeds but may charge the farmers a technology fee for the right
to do so. 8 Such a licensing rule has not received comprehensive examination in

1
See generally Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93 (2006).
2
Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta Post-Sale Patentee Controls, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 682, 688–92 (2008).
3
See Jason Savich, Note, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion on SelfReplicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 115 (2007).
4
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 345 F. App’x 552 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Monsanto Co. v.
Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
5
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79805 (E.D. Ky.
Oct. 3, 2008).
6
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
7
Tempe Smith, Note, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto as a Case Study to Examine the Patent
and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of Genetically Modified Seeds, 61 ALA. L. REV. 629,
640–41 (2010); see infra Part II, sect C for discussion of tying.
8
Smith, supra note 7, at 647–48.
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the patent exhaustion context. In this Note I argue that an SRT doctrine that
exhausts the patentee’s rights in the physical chattel, but preserves the patentee’s
rights in the exploitation of its patent claims, would affect much-needed reform in
this fraught area. Part II details why licenses such as Monsanto’s offend
fundamental public policy. The next three Parts propose three exhaustion benefits
of a structure such as Smith’s: 1) reconciling SRT with the full line of Supreme
Court patent exhaustion precedent, 2) resolving the tension in the districts’ and
Federal Circuit’s decisions, and 3) reforming the broader first-sale doctrine.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OF MONSANTO’S TRANSGENIC-SEED LICENSES
The disconnect between patent exhaustion and SRT is embodied in the case
of Monsanto’s “Roundup Ready”® seeds. Monsanto makes the world’s bestselling weed-killer, Roundup, whose active ingredient is glyphosate. 9
Glyphosate’s drawback in farming is that it cannot discriminate between crops and
weeds; it kills both. 10 In 1996 Monsanto developed a process of inserting genes
into the seed germplasm that would render the resulting plant immune to
Roundup. 11 Monsanto received patents on the Roundup-resistant genes and the
insertion process, then licensed the technology to about 200 seed producers in the
United States. 12 This first Roundup Ready® technology was limited to soybean
seeds; in 1998 Monsanto patented and licensed a parallel technology in cotton
seeds. 13 Since then, seed producers have been practicing the Monsanto patents to
generate seeds for sale to farmers, 14 with profound effects. Before 1996, no crops
in the United States were grown by transgenic seeds; today, Monsanto’s transgenic
soybean seeds represent 95% of the country’s soybean market. 15 The company’s
revenues approached $6.5 billion in 2005. 16 Though researchers have made
progress developing crop traits resistant to other forms of herbicide, 17 these rival
technologies have evidently not inhibited Monsanto’s market power. This
suggests that Monsanto’s market position is embedded enough to preclude the
emergence of generic glyphosate-resistance seeds after the patent expires. 18

9

Savich, supra note 3, at 117.
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584, 587 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
11
Id.
12
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
13
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
14
Jon Sievers, Note, Not So Fast My Friend: What the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Means to the
Seed Industry After Quanta v. LG Electronics, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 355, 362 (2009).
15
Michael Stumo, Anticompetitive Tactics in AG Biotech Could Stifle Entrance of Generic Traits,
15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 137, 139 (2010).
16
Savich, supra note 3, at 123–24.
17
See Ganesh M. Kishore et al., History of Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Methods of Development
and Current State of the Art—Emphasis on Glyphosate Tolerance, 6 WEED TECH. 626, 626–34 (1992).
18
See Stumo, supra note 15, at 139, 143.
10
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A. “Bag Tags:” How the Farmer Lost Title to Second-Generation Seed
Monsanto has employed a controversial licensing structure to protect its
patented genes and processes. Traditionally, farmers who purchased seeds have
always been free to plant second-generation seeds, which grow naturally on the
crops. 19 This tradition is expressly preserved by the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA). Under the Act, seed producers who cross-breed seeds to enhance
desirable characteristics can prevent others from exploiting that cross-breeding. 20
However, the PVPA contains a “farmer’s exception” that gives farmers a
proprietary right in their second-generation seeds. 21 Aware that farmers who
purchased Roundup Ready® seeds would be free to replant under the current law,
Monsanto imposed a two-tiered licensing scheme on the distribution of its seeds. 22
The first tier is the license to the seed producers who practice the genetic patents in
growing seeds. 23 Seed producers pay Monsanto $6.50 for every fifty-pound bag
conveyed to a farmer, 24 and the seed producers agree not to transfer seed to
farmers in fee simple, but instead through licenses. 25 As for the second tier,
farmers must agree to “bag tag” licenses—so called because they are attached to
the seed bags—to acquire the seeds. 26 The bag tag requires farmers to pay
Monsanto another $6.50-per-bag technology fee; this is in addition to the royalty
fee Monsanto receives from the seed producer and the retail price the seed
producer charges farmers. 27 In addition, the bag tag prohibits farmers from saving
second-generation seeds, 28 effectively requiring the farmer to destroy the seeds

19
Smith, supra note 7, at 639 (“In an amicus brief in support of [a farmer who saved secondgeneration seed], the Center for Food Safety argued that by not allowing farmers to save seed the courts
were substantially altering the way that farmers throughout the country use seed.”).
20
7 U.S.C.S. § 2541 (LexisNexis 2011). See Debra L. Blair, Note, Intellectual Property and Its
Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 312 (1999) (“To be eligible for protection
under the PVPA . . . [1] the plant must be new; [2] the plant must be a distinct or novel variety . . . ; [3]
the plant must be uniform and stable; [4] the plant must reproduce sexually; [5] a complete description
of the plant . . . must be provided; and [5] a deposit of the seed must be made for viability testing.”).
21
7 U.S.C.S. § 2543 (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that no liability exists under the PVPA where a
farmer purchased seeds from the seed variety’s owner and saved second-generation seeds for future
planting).
22
Savich, supra note 3, at 119.
23
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584, 587 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
24
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
25
Sievers, supra note 14, at 362.
26
Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 588–89.
27
Smith, supra note 7, at 631.
28
One Monsanto bag tag license requires the farmer to agree:
To use the seed containing the Monsanto gene technologies for planting
commercial crop only in a single season. To not supply any of this seed to any
other person or entity for planting, and to not save any crop produced from the
seed for replanting, or supply saved seed to anyone for replanting. To not use the
seed or provide it to anyone for crop breeding, research, generation of herbicide
registration data or seed production.
Sievers, supra note 14, at 632 (quoting Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection
for Plant Innovation: Unresolved Issues After J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 20 NAT. BIOTECHNOLOGY 1161, 1163
(2002)).
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every season and repurchase them at full retail price. 29
When a farmer violates the license, Monsanto sues not for breach of contract
but for outright patent infringement, 30 a more lucrative cause of action thanks to
the possibility of punitive and treble damages. 31 As of 2005, Monsanto collected
over $15 million in damages from farmers. 32 Today, many farming communities
see little choice but to abandon their traditional seed-saving practice and comply
with the Monsanto license. 33 Practitioner Michael Stumo argues that, based on the
high startup and regulatory costs of bringing a transgenic seed to market,
Monsanto’s practices are unlikely to be checked by price competition, absent
certain legal reforms. 34 Professor Peter Carstensen’s research buttresses this
theory: the planting of second-generation seeds “has almost entirely disappeared
from soybeans and cotton,” 35 indicating that Monsanto customers are not seeking a
rival.
The question that divides IP commentators is whether the Monsanto
licensing scheme violates patent exhaustion. 36 Described in the 1873 Supreme
Court opinion Adams v. Burke, the principle is this: “[W]hen the patentee . . . sells
a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the
consideration for its use and the parts with the right to restrict that use.” 37 In Part
III, I argue that the Court’s default stance is that the patentee’s rights in a patentembodying chattel are exhausted when the chattel passes from the manufacturer to
the end-user, so long as the manufacturer’s license permitted the conveyance. 38
The one exception, arguably, is that the patentee can restrict the purchaser’s use to
further a consumer-welfare policy justification. 39 Most transfers of patented goods
fall clearly inside or outside the rule. 40 Yet chattels that self-replicate, such as

29

See Stumo, supra note 15, at 141.
See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Scruggs, 342 F. Supp.
2d at 589.
31
See Caprice L. Roberts, Intellectual Property Remedies: The Case for Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 679 (2010); Symposium,
Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025, 1030 (2006).
32
Winston, supra note 1, at 103.
33
Symposium, supra note 31, at 1046.
34
See generally, Stumo, supra note 15.
35
See supra note 33.
36
Compare Savich, supra note 3, with Winston, supra note 1.
37
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873).
38
See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (finding exhaustion
of patented microprocessors where manufacturer was authorized to sell the processors); United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (invalidating patentee’s license controlling conduct of patented
prescription lens purchasers); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895) (following
Burke, 84 U.S. at 453); Burke, 84 U.S. at 453 (1873) (refusing to enforce manufacturer’s territorial
restriction against the manufacturer’s customers); See infra Part III.
39
See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938) (upholding patentee’s
authority to restrict the class of purchasers to whom manufacturer could sell).
40
Typically a transfer fails to trigger exhaustion only where 1) the sale deprived the patentee of its
royalty (see Ardente, Inc. v. Shanley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11674, at *18–20 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10,
2010); Discovision Ass’s. v. Toshiba Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41662, at *26–30 (S.D.N.Y. May
30
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seeds, occupy a twilight zone. Structurally, the conveyance of the chattel from
manufacturer to user should extinguish patentee rights. 41 Functionally, however,
the purchaser of SRT is not only a user but also an accidental maker of the good.
Even though a farmer who saves seed does so only for personal use, that use
certainly causes the patentee to lose sales—the farmer becomes his or her own
supplier. As the magnitude of the loss balloons, so does the patentee’s colorable
justification for restricting post-sale use, such as seed-saving. 42
For marginal cases such as this, resort should be made to the policies that
have girded the exhaustion doctrine since its inception. The competing propertyright policies most implicated in exhaustion are the patentee’s right to exclude
others from trespassing on the claim language, 43 counterpoised against a
purchaser’s longstanding common-law right to alienate freely his movable
property. 44 Serving both property and competition goals is the principle that a
patentee cannot assert IP rights that do not appear in the claim language: 45 in a
property sense, this is like the homeowner who uses self-help against his
neighbor’s trespassers; 46 and in the antitrust sense, it is like the competitor who
leverages his advantage in one market to seize control of another. 47 From a pure
competition standpoint, scholars warn that post-sale patentee rights create upward
pressure on prices and unnatural output shortages, 48 outcomes that the Sherman

18, 2009)) or 2) the license expressly forbade the transfer (see New Medium, LLC, v. Barco N.V., 612
F. Supp. 2d 958, 961–64 (N.D. Ill. 2009)).
41
See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625–28 (reciting the Court’s line of patent exhaustion precedent and
identifying the transfer of chattel from manufacturer to purchaser as the moment of exhaustion in each).
42
As the Federal Circuit described this dilemma in Scruggs, “[t]he fact that a patented technology
can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the technology.”
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
43
Though Professor Mossoff concedes that the “right to exclude” is commonly invoked as the
essential patent right, he concludes that this characterization of patent rights overlooks other rights that
nineteenth-century precedent granted patentees. Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent
Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 324–26 (2009).
44
Supporting a robust first sale rule in the copyright context, Professor Winston quotes a U.S.
Copyright Office report, which finds this fundamental U.S. legal principle: “[R]estraints on the
alienation of tangible property are to be avoided in the absence of clear congressional intent to abrogate
this principle.” Winston, supra note 1, at 103 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO §104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT, vii
(2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf).
45
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002) (holding
that the patentee may assert property rights only in what is claimed in the final patent grant); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) (finding that the Supreme Court has long sought
“to give effect to the public policy which limits the granted monopoly strictly to the terms of the
statutory grant.”).
46
The landmark article proposing that delineations among property rights are fundamental to
establishing and preserving social relationships is Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in
MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000).
47
The classic cases of this kind are International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
(finding defendant improperly required lessees of its patented salt-processing machine to allow the
defendant to match salt retailer’s prices) and United States v. Loew’s, 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (holding that
in licensing motion picture rights to broadcasters, defendant improperly tied “A” pictures to undesirable
“B” pictures).
48
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (emphasizing that
a fundamental patent policy is the avoidance of monopolies); Harry First, The IP Grab: The Struggle
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Act, Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act have signaled are offensive
to a free market. 49 A leading commentator on the subject, Professor Harry First,
argues that use restrictions after a first sale have the potential to fix prices, no less
than other price-controls that have been found per se illegal. 50 It is against this
policy backdrop that authors have weighed in on Monsanto’s licenses, each
invoking those considerations that either favor or rebuke the company’s practice.
B. A Snapshot of the “Bag Tag” Debate
Most commentators react to the Monsanto seed dilemma in one of two ways:
they believe that the transfer of SRT to the user is either a pure license, in which
case the patentee’s rights may be extended through contract, or a pure sale, in
which case those rights expire. The former camp exerts much emphasis on the
patent goal of excluding non-patentees from exploiting the patent, reasoning that
otherwise the Patent Act’s power to motivate innovation is compromised. 51 Jason
Savich argues that without post-transfer licenses, “free-riders who do not bear the
costs of [research and development]” 52 could “immediately go into direct
competition with the inventor . . . .” 53 While one farmer cannot reasonably be
characterized as a Monsanto “competitor” (the farmer is not licensing or selling the
seed), an entire community of seed-saving farmers can amount to a new entrant to
the market, who is dramatically undercutting Monsanto’s price. Similarly, Jon
Sievers argues that farmers who plant second-generation seed are not so much seed
users as makers, observing, “Patent law has long established that the authorized
use of the invention does not authorize the right to make the product.” 54 James
Beard concludes that when the consumer community becomes the patentee’s de
facto competitor, the patentee is forced to charge a higher up-front price for the
product in order to recoup his investment. 55 In the Monsanto context, without its
bag tag licenses Monsanto might be forced to charge seed producers much more
than the current technology royalties, which in turn would inflate retail prices.
This school of commentators concludes that the only way to avoid such pricegouging is to preserve the status quo.

Between Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust: Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect
Innovation, Not Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L. J. 365, 386–90 (2007); Yuichi Watanabe, The Doctrine of
Patent Exhaustion: The Impact of Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 273,
275–76 (2009).
49
See 6–19 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (Supp. 2010).
50
First, supra note 48, at 387.
51
Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz has found the practicing of license to be a critical factor in the
acceleration of innovation under a patent system. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s
Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 203–08 (2009).
52
Savich, supra note 3, at 120. See also Sievers, supra note 14, at 361 (stating that “in 2005, a
small number of seed companies invested more than $554 million in research and development of seed
technologies.”).
53
Savich, supra note 3, at 127.
54
Sievers, supra note 14, at 356.
55
James Beard, The Limits of Licensing: Quanta v. LGE and the New Doctrine of Simultaneous
Exhaustion, 2008 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 37 (2008).
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At a more abstract level, this position is a critique of the habitually-invoked
idea that an IP owner must collect his fee for IP-embodying chattel in one discrete
transaction, 56 what Professor Glen Robinson calls the “one-reward idea.” 57
Professor Robinson urges a return to the nineteenth-century concept of patent
rights as analogous to land rights, 58 allowing a range of servitudes imposed on
subsequent use of the property. 59 Calling the one-reward formula “empty,”
Robinson concludes that a patentee may “take some of its economic rent in the
form of limitations on use instead of cash.” 60 As examined in Part IV, when the
Federal Circuit considered two challenges to the Monsanto licenses, McFarling
and Scruggs, the court sided with this bloc of scholars. 61
Others, however, view the Monsanto seed transfer as a pure sale on the
theory that patent exhaustion cannot tolerate post-conveyance royalties or
restrictions. Professor Mark Patterson concludes that Monsanto’s property rights
no longer exist when the seed producer conveys seed to the farmer; instead
Monsanto’s only cause of action against seed-saving farmers is breach of contract
for flouting the bag tags. 62 Tod Leaven agrees, reasoning that because “use of the
first-generation seed is inseparable from the manufacture of second-generation
seed,” the farmer retains his status as an end-user and enjoys the full benefit of
patent exhaustion. 63 Responding to the argument that invaliding Monsanto’s bag
tags would raise prices, farmers argue that the license currently allows Monsanto
to extract an exorbitant price. In McFarling, the plaintiff presented evidence that,

56
The Supreme Court in Univis Lens considered this concept fundamental to patent exhaustion
law, writing,
Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law is
fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his
reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the article, and that once that
purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and
enjoyment of the thing sold.
United States v. Univis Lens, Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251(1942). Professor John Rothchild describes this
concept succinctly in the copyright first-sale context: “[O]nce the copyright owner has sold a copy at
the price that he has set, he has obtained all the revenue to which the statute entitles him.” John A.
Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2004).
57
Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1496 (2004).
58
Id. at 1523; see also Mossoff, supra note 43, at 332–33.
59
Robinson reasons that, just as the current owner of Blackacre can impose restrictive covenants
on the use of subsequent owners, provided they do not offend public policy, a patentee should be able to
impose covenants on the practice of the patent during the patent term. Robinson, supra note 57, at
1496–97.
60
Id.
61
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,
302 F.3d 1291, 1293, (Fed. Cir. 2002); see infra Part IV.
62
Symposium, supra note 31, at 1029.
63
Tod Michael Leaven, Recent Development, The Misinterpretation of the Patent Exhaustion
Doctrine and the Transgenic Seed Industry in Light of Quanta v. LG Electronics, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
119, 138 (2008); Yina Dong, A Patent Exhaustion Exposition: Situating Quanta v. LGE in the Context
of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 34 (2010) (quoting Keeler v. Standard
Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895)).
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without the bag tag, a farmer would save seventeen dollars per fifty-pound bag. 64
Reacting to patentees’ abrogation of patent exhaustion, Professor Elizabeth
Winston advocates allowing courts to invalidate “sham” licenses, that is, licenses
that have the attributes of pure sales. 65 According to Winston, courts should test
whether a license is in fact a sale by balancing the traditional contract-construction
factors such as industry custom, trade usage, course of dealing, and parties’
relative bargaining powers. 66 Winston also believes that “extremely expensive”
and “readily reusable” products raise a presumption in favor of licensing, whereas
“perishable, inexpensive, or . . . single-use” items favor pure sales. 67 Applied to
Monsanto’s transgenic seeds, however, these factors point in opposing directions.
Trade usage in the farming industry has historically favored seed-saving as a
cherished cultural norm. 68 However, between 1996 and now, the course of dealing
among farmers, seed producers, and Monsanto has reinforced the legitimacy of the
Monsanto licenses. 69 Furthermore, whereas transgenic seeds are perishable and
fairly inexpensive, they must be considered “readily reusable” because they selfregenerate.
C. Why Modern Patent Exhaustion Fails to Account for SRT
Parts III and IV of this Note explain why, doctrinally, neither the pure-sale
approach nor the pure-license approach is faithful to the Supreme Court’s patent
exhaustion precedent. But how well do these opposing viewpoints serve the social
reasons behind exhaustion? While the pure-sale approach clashes with certain
patent policies, I find the unchecked approval of Monsanto’s licenses by far the
greater danger to the fundamental property and competition goals embodied in the
exhaustion rule. From a property viewpoint, the Monsanto license shrinks the
farmers’ bundle of rights to a level unobserved since the patent system began. 70
Monsanto’s attempt to eliminate any vestige of a farmer’s ownership interest in
seed has proven effective, as the “millennia-old” 71 tradition of seed-saving has all
but disappeared in soybean and cotton. In addition, because the property interests
that the farmer loses are automatically captured by Monsanto, the licenses sharply
violate the policy of limiting a patentee’s monopoly to the four corners of its

64
Savich, supra note 3, at 128 (citing Corrected Brief of Appellant at 5–6, Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1177)). Savich counters that, “[w]hile the initial
costs of Roundup Ready® seed are higher for farmers, farmers make other economic gains in the form
of reduced labor for pest and weed control as well as improved crop yields.” Id. at 129. Of course, one
could also observe that Monsanto directly benefits from farmers’ planting Roundup Ready® seeds,
even in the second generation, because those farmers are buying more Roundup.
65
Winston, supra note 1, at 121.
66
Id. at 123.
67
Id. at 124.
68
Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 247, 255 (2003).
69
Farmers have almost entirely abandoned seed-saving in the soybean and cotton industries.
Symposium, supra note 31, at 1046.
70
See generally, Aoki, supra note 68.
71
Id. at 255.
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patent. 72 It is true that a fraction of what the farmer loses colorably reads on
Monsanto’s patent—the practicing of genetic-engineering claims. 73 Yet the rest of
the farmer’s lost property is in the seed’s natural traits, traits in which Monsanto
has no legitimate property interest. 74 The situation raises dire competition
problems: in Professor First’s estimation, courts’ “allow[ing] the patentee to
impose whatever restrictions will maximize his returns” 75 empowers companies to
charge “monopoly rents.” 76 In Monsanto’s case, because Monsanto’s fees under
the license are not inspiring price-rivalry from other companies, the company’s
rent-seeking is a particularly acute harm to consumer welfare. In addition, First’s
competition research indicates that when a patent rule allows rampant rent-seeking,
the patentee is receiving not compensation for innovation but a windfall.
Removing that windfall, according to First, would not disturb the innovation
incentive that the Patent Act envisions. 77 When courts and scholars caution that
invalidation of the Monsanto licenses would “eviscerate” Monsanto’s power to
recover its costs, 78 they assume that the only two options are to preserve the status
quo or to grant farmers a fee simple title. 79 In advocating the former, they ignore
the licenses’ repugnance to centuries-old principles.
Fortunately, there is an alternative to the license/sale dichotomy. Tempe
Smith, then a law student at the University of Alabama Law School, examined an
antitrust suit against Monsanto alleging that the bag tag licenses were an illegal
tying arrangement. Smith concludes that the license is likely illegal under the
Sherman Act, because Monsanto is tying its patented matter (the genes and geneinserting process) to a matter in which it has no property rights (natural seed
characteristics). 80 Citing Monsanto’s licensing practices outside the U.S., Smith

72
The policy can be traced throughout not only patent exhaustion precedent but also unfair
competition precedent. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 360
(1961) (finding no evidence in the legislative history of any Patent Act amendments that Congress
intended to grant patentees greater rights than in the literal language of the Act); United States v. Univis
Lens, Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) (relying on “the public policy which limits the granted monopoly
strictly to the terms of the statutory grant.”); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (stating that a patentee’s right to control personal property “must be limited to
the invention described in the claims of his patent.”); CSU, LLC v. Xerox Corp. (In re Independent
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a patentee may not
exploit its statutory right to prohibit sales to achieve monopoly in market outside the patent scope); In re
Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract Litig., 850 F. Supp. 769, 773–74 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (stating
that a patentee’s conditioning licensee’s practice of patent on the purchase of items outside the patent
claims is per se patent misuse).
73
This single fact appears to have been dispositive in both Scruggs and McFarling. Monsanto Co.
v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293,
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
74
Winston, supra note 1, at 99.
75
First, supra note 48, at 388.
76
Id. at 389.
77
Id. at 386–88.
78
Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336.
79
This may be because the defendants in the Monsanto cases have pled patent exhaustion as an
absolute defense to any of the post-conveyance terms in the bag tag licenses. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at
1335; Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
80
Smith, supra note 7, at 640.

2011

SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGY AND PATENT EXHAUSTION

11

proposes that “[a]n alternative to the current model would be for Monsanto to
allow farmers to save their seed but pay a license fee directly to Monsanto each
year.” 81 Smith posits that this reform of the license is necessary to prevent an
antitrust violation. I submit that such a license is also necessary to prevent
offenses to the policy goals of patent exhaustion. To this end, Parts III-V of this
Note explore the doctrinal and policy benefits of allowing farmers to be the
outright owners of their seeds, while allowing Monsanto to charge farmers a
royalty on the duplication of Monsanto-patented genes. To begin with, such a rule
would bring transfers of SRT in line with the history of Supreme Court exhaustion
jurisprudence.
III. SUPREME COURT PATENT EXHAUSTION PRECEDENT: A PATTERN EMERGES
In 2008 the Supreme Court decided Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 82
its first foray into patent exhaustion since 1942. 83 Understanding Quanta therefore
is crucial to understanding the Court’s exhaustion jurisprudence. The basic facts
are that LG licensed to Intel the right to sell microprocessors practicing LG
patents. 84 The license required Intel to notify its customers that they were
forbidden from combining the processors with non-LG or non-Intel technology. 85
One of these customers, Quanta Computer, mingled the processors with other
companies’ parts and was sued by LG for infringement. 86 The unanimous opinion
held that LG’s control over the processors ended when Intel sold them to Quanta,
for the simple reason that the license agreement authorized Intel to make such
sales. 87 Some read Quanta narrowly, concluding that, had LG required that
Quanta become an LG licensee to take the microprocessors, LG could have
restricted Quanta’s use. 88 This interpretation would entirely preserve Monsanto’s
two-tiered licensing scheme. 89 Indeed, if Quanta is our only source, we could
conclude that it is entirely the patentee’s prerogative whether a transfer is an
authorized sale or a conditional transfer, such as a license. 90 But if this is so, what

81

Id. at 641.
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
83
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
84
Quanta, 533 U.S. at 623.
85
Id. at 623–24. According to the Court, the LG–Intel agreement provided that “no license ‘is
granted . . . to any third party for the combination by a third party of Licensed Products of either party
with items, components, or the like acquired . . . from sources other than a party hereto . . . .’” Id. at
623.
86
Id. at 624.
87
Id. at 637.
88
In Sievers’ interpretation of Quanta, “the Supreme Court crafted its decision very narrowly.”
Sievers, supra note 14, at 372.
89
Id.
90
According to James Beard:
In cases where no conditions limit the manufacturer licensee’s authority to sell
products, the patentee cannot use private licensing to opt-out of . . . patent
exhaustion. Where the sale from licensee to purchaser is unconditional, a private
arrangement between the patentee and licensee cannot create license privity with
82
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patentee would authorize a sale? Professor First cautions against the narrow
Quanta interpretation, concluding that end-user licenses undermine the goals of the
first-sale doctrine. 91 Practitioner Jason McCammon agrees, concluding that the
goal of Quanta was to prevent LG from extracting fresh royalties at multiple stages
of distribution. 92 For this reason, McCammon comments, “one doubts that the
outcome would have been different had LG simply altered the wording of the
license agreement.” 93
A literal reading of Quanta also ignores a fundamental precept of patent
exhaustion: when a patentee licenses the patent, the scope of the license can cover
only the scope of the patentee’s claim language. 94 Though Quanta does not refer
to this over-arching exhaustion policy, the opinion helpfully reinstates the Court’s
entire line of exhaustion cases. 95 Such affirmation matters, because in the three
decades prior to Quanta, the Federal Circuit had aggressively abrogated patent
exhaustion. 96 Now the old cases are good law again, and my interpretation of the
case line is that a patentee’s rights are presumed to extinguish when the patented
chattel passes from a licensed manufacturer to a user, unless a pro-consumer policy
justifies a use restriction. In a similar take, McCammon believes that the
narrowest defensible reading of the Quanta line is that conditions burdening a
transfer are scrutinized for reasonableness, mindful that extensions of monopolies
generally offend public policy. 97 Such an interpretation strongly suggests that
Monsanto cannot impose a license on the entire seed purchased by the farmer
without breaching public policy, but that a royalty on the duplication of a seed’s

downstream purchasers and users.
Beard, supra note 55, at 35.
91
First, supra note 48, at 365–66 (2007); Winston, supra note 1, at 106–07.
92
Jason McCammon, Recent Development: The Validity of Conditional Sales: Competing View of
Patent Exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 785, 794 (2009).
93
Id. Quanta’s wariness of artful drafting of patent claims lends support to this view: the Court
firmly held that method-claim patents must be subject to exhaustion, because otherwise patentees would
craft composition-of-matter claims as method claims. The Court admonished that such a drafting “endrun” would “seriously undermine the exhaustion doctrine.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
553 U.S. 617, 629–30 (2008).
94
Dong has surveyed the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion precedent and concluded: “License
restrictions that are not within the scope of the patent rights are considered patent misuse . . . .” Dong,
supra note 63, at 25. See also Winston, supra note 1, at 108. In principle, even scholars such as Savich
agree that “a patentee may not impose the condition to impermissibly broaden the physical or temporal
scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.” Savich, supra note 3, at 123.
95
Quanta, 553 U.S at 625 (citing Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852), and discussing
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873)); id. at 625–26 (reaffirming the overturning of Henry v. A.B. Dick
& Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), and citing Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913)); id. at 626
(discussing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mgt. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)); id. at 627–28
(discussing United States v. Univis Lens, Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942)); id. at 629 (discussing Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940)); id. at 636 (affirming and distinguishing Gen.
Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938)); id. at 637 (quoting Keeler v. Standard
Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895)).
96
See infra Part IV.
97
McCammon, supra note 92, at 794–95. McCammon writes that an equally defensible reading of
Quanta is that a patentee’s rights can never endure after an authorized transfer from manufacturer to
user of patent-practicing chattel. Id. at 791–92.
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transgenic qualities would be upheld under a consumer-welfare justification.
A. The Default: Patentee Rights Sever Upon Transfer to End-User
The cases that Quanta reinstated follow an unmistakable pattern: when a
patent-embodying good passes from the licensee-manufacturer to a user, that
transfer cuts off the patentee’s interest in the chattel. This pattern began in 1873
with Adams v. Burke, in which the patentee licensed its coffin-lid technology to a
manufacturer, whose sale of the finished lids was restricted by a territorial
license. 98 One of the manufacturer’s customers subsequently sold the lids outside
the authorized territory, but the Court held that the patentee could not restrict the
sale, as the lid had already passed from manufacturer to user. 99 The Court soon
extended Adams to multiple-use items in Keeler, 100 and Quanta now extends
Adams even where the license agreement claims to restrict the behavior of the
licensee’s customers. 101
The structure holds true even where the manufacturer’s customer is also a
licensee of the patentee. In Univis Lens, the defendant Univis patented the
grinding of prescription lenses, 102 which it licensed to the manufacturer of an
unfinished product called a “lens blank.” 103 The manufacturer’s customers were
“finishers” who ground the lenses for retail, 104 and they too were Univis
licensees. 105 The Court invalidated this second-tier license between Univis and the
finishers. 106 Finally, this pattern of exhaustion holds true even where the
manufacturer’s conduct and user’s conduct read on different patent claims. In
Ethyl Gasoline, the defendant had a composition-of-matter claim on a type of fuel
and a separate claim on the fuel’s use. 107 The defendant licensed the compositionof-matter claim to oil refiners on the condition that they sell only to “jobbers” who
were also licensees. 108 To these jobbers the defendant licensed the patent’s use
claim, a licensing tier that the Court invalidated under patent exhaustion. 109
Reading the opinions, one hears the echo of three fundamental public
policies. First, encumbrances on tangible property work indignity on property
owners by removing their autonomy. According to Keeler, free alienability is “an
essential incident of . . . ownership,” 110 and Motion Picture Patents stresses the

98

Adams, 84 U.S. at 458 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 457.
100
Keeler, 157 U.S. at 666.
101
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. L.G. Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–37 (2008).
102
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 243 (1942).
103
Id. at 246.
104
Id. at 244.
105
Id. at 245.
106
Id. at 250.
107
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 446 (1940).
108
Id. at 457.
109
Id.
110
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895).
99

14

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. V:I

need to give consumers repose without “annoyance” from patentees. 111 Second,
allowing patentees to extend their property interests outside the patent language
risks facilitating monopolization without any benefits to innovation. Bloomer v.
McQuewan, the pre-Adams case that proposed the exhaustion rule in dicta, cited
this exact danger; 112 Ethyl Gasoline observes that when fuel customers become
licensees, the fuel patentee “naturally” becomes a monopolist in two markets,
rather than only one. 113 Third, servitudes on patented goods tend to raise prices
and create artificial scarcity, beyond the price- and supply-controls inherent in the
patent system. In prescient analysis, Bloomer describes how a post-sale use
restriction would inflate prices to supra-competitive levels, an evil that the opinion
directs future courts to avoid. 114 Univis Lens and Ethyl Gasoline did just this by
preventing the patentee from extracting a royalty at two stages of distribution, in
the name of consumer welfare. 115
Under this line of cases and the goals they represent, a court should presume
that the transfer of transgenic seed exhausts Monsanto’s rights in the seed. 116
Despite the clarity of this precedent, some academics (and the Federal Circuit)
mistakenly believe that a patentee can sidestep exhaustion by characterizing the
sale as “conditional.” 117 As evidence, commentators cite cases such as Motion
Picture Patents, which found patent exhaustion when the terms of a sale were
“unconditional.” 118 Such a reading ignores the context of the Court’s language:
Motion Picture Patents was referring to a situation where a patentee did set
conditions on the manufacturers’ retail sales—minimum prices—yet because such
conditions were repugnant to public policy, the sales triggered exhaustion. 119
Therefore, “unconditional” sales are not sales on which the patentee imposes zero
restrictions, but sales whose restrictions do not offend the public interest. 120
111
112
113
114
115

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1852) (McLean, J., dissenting).
Ethyl Gasoline, 309 U.S. at 454–55.
Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 557 (McLean, J., dissenting).
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline, 309 U.S. at 456–

57.
116
Quanta offers Monsanto the possibility of recovering from the farmers under a breach of
contract theory. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. L.G. Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (“LGE’s complaint
does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract damages
might be available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages.”). As Professor
Patterson points out, however, breach of contract recoveries do not include the punitive and treble
damages that infringement claims can bring and so are not as worthwhile for Monsanto to pursue.
Symposium, supra note 31, at 1030.
117
See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Daniel R. Cahoy,
Oasis or Mirage?: Efficient Breach as a Relief to the Burden of Contractual Recapture of Patent and
Copyright Limitations, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 135, 151–52 (2003) (“[C]ontractual restrictions on use
rights following a sale have the function of converting the sale into a licensing arrangement, actionable
in breach if the conditions are not fulfilled.”).
118
Motion Picture Patents, Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1917) (“[T]he right
to ‘vend’ is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale . . . .”). Adam Mossoff takes this language to
mean that only sales with no conditions trigger patent exhaustion. Mossoff, supra note 43, at 373.
119
Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 516 (citing Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913)).
120
McCammon believes that Quanta at the very least requires a court to inquire into whether a
post-sale use restriction comports with the necessary limits of the patent monopoly. McCammon, supra
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Practitioner Thomas G. Hungar’s research confirms that a colloquial reading of the
word “reflect[s] a misunderstanding” of its use as a term of art in early exhaustion
cases. 121
B. The Exception: Patentee Asserts Pro-Consumer Business Justification
The Court’s presumption of exhaustion has one exception, observed only
once, in General Talking Pictures. There, AT&T licensed its patent on vacuum
tube amplifiers to a manufacturer, on the condition that the amplifiers be sold only
for private use. 122 When the defendant purchased and resold the amplifiers for
theatrical use, AT&T sued for infringement. 123 According to the Court, the
defendant’s purchase had not exhausted AT&T’s interest, because the
manufacturer had breached the license’s sales terms, 124 and only an authorized sale
triggers patent exhaustion. 125
Because of the outlier result of General, it necessarily creates “tension” with
Quanta. 126 McCammon proposes two schemes for reconciling the cases. One is
that, because the defendants in both cases attempted to limit the scope of
downstream purchasers’ use, the exhaustion result in Quanta limits General
closely to its facts. 127 In the alternative, Quanta’s decision not to overrule General
may imply that post-sale use restrictions are scrutinized for “reasonableness” in
light of patent law’s goals. 128 Elucidating what restrictions might be “reasonable,”
other commentators argue that what made the difference in General was AT&T’s
pro-consumer business justification for its restrictive licensing.
AT&T’s
amplifiers had two natural markets—private and theatrical—that would pay
dramatically different prices. 129 If private-use customers could achieve arbitrage
and undersell AT&T in the theatrical market, AT&T would be unable to price
discriminate between the markets, 130 and would have to charge the theatrical price
for all. Therefore, maintaining the two-market structure kept prices low for private
users, a compelling justification. Incorporating the public policies described
earlier in this Part, the rule of thumb should be to uphold a license that preserves
free alienability of movables, but not to an extent that jeopardizes overall

note 92, at 794–95.
121
Thomas G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 49 IDEA 517, 532 (2009).
122
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179–80 (1938).
123
Id at 180.
124
Id. at 181 (“The Transformer Company could not convey to petitioner what both knew it was
not authorized to sell”).
125
Id.
126
See McCammon, supra note 92, at 790.
127
Id. at 791.
128
Id. at 794.
129
General Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 180.
130
Professor Patterson interprets patent exhaustion cases as permitting post-sale use restrictions
that would allow a scheme of price discrimination that keeps prices lower than they otherwise would be.
Symposium, supra note 31, at 1034–35.
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consumer welfare. 131 As Beard puts it, post-sale “limitations must be for a
substantive reason beyond a desire to control the use or value of the patent by
downstream purchasers.” 132
The question, then, is whether public policy justifies the Monsanto licenses.
As is, the licenses’ mandate to destroy seed unavoidably breaches the fundamental
property rights and consumer-welfare goals of the Quanta line. The erasure of a
federally-protected farmer’s proprietary right in seed, 133 the enablement of rentlevel royalty fees, paired with the entrenchment of Monsanto’s market share,
reveal the that the harms anticipated in Bloomer have been realized in the
Monsanto scheme. Therefore, allowing the licenses to persist must be a
miscarriage of exhaustion policy. Yet, as explored in Part II, if Monsanto could
not control second-generation planting, it may transfer all of its R&D costs to the
initial seed sale, resulting in a prohibitively high retail price. 134 The only way for a
court to balance competing exhaustion policies is to give farmers an ownership
right in Roundup Ready® seed, allowing them to replant multiple generations. At
the same time, mindful of General, Monsanto should be able to collect a royalty
for second-generation planting, provided that the royalty reflects only the value of
Monsanto’s genetic-engineering patents. This rule in the exhaustion context is
thus harmonious with Tempe Smith’s research in the antitrust context.
The availability of such a license also calls into doubt an assumption that
Quanta and nearly all commentators make—that Monsanto, even if it cannot sue
seed-saving farmers for infringement, may sue the farmers for breach of contract
under the current licensing scheme. 135 While contract remedies do not include
treble damages, we should assume that the prospect of a breach of contract suit
would deter Monsanto’s farmer customers from seed-saving no less than the
specter of an infringement claim would. 136 It follows that allowing contract
remedies under the current Monsanto license would offend the public policies
behind exhaustion no less than tort remedies would; the farmers would continue to
abrogate their ownership rights by destroying seed, and Monsanto would continue
to work competition harms on the market. If courts were presented with a
reformed Monsanto license—one that allows farmers to seed-save for a seasonal
fee—they are more likely to find the current all-or-nothing license unenforceable
under any cause of action.
IV. TENSION IN THE DISTRICTS AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The idea of legally separating a seed’s patent-practicing qualities from its

131

See supra text accompanying notes 110–115.
Beard, supra note 55, at 29.
133
See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
134
See supra Part II.
135
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008); Watanabe, supra note
48, at 286; Sue Ann Mota, The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: Not Exhausted by Quanta Computer v.
LG Electronics in 2008, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 337, 346 (2008).
136
See supra text accompanying notes 32–35.
132
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other qualities would also resolve the tension in the District and Federal Circuit
decisions. Our federal courts, like most commentators, largely assume that a
transfer of patent-practicing chattel must resemble either a pure license or a pure
sale, even when the chattel involved practices SRT. 137 In the pure-license column
is the Federal Circuit, which over the past three decades has steadily limited the
doctrine of exhaustion. 138 Most relevant to SRT, the Circuit decided in
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. that a post-transfer use-restricting license
could not be invalidated under patent exhaustion unless the license violates unfair
competition laws. 139 In so holding, the Federal Circuit never properly inquires
whether the patentee’s post-transfer restrictions control more than the patentee
actually owns, which is an analysis that the Supreme Court precedent requires. 140
Mallinckrodt acknowledges that “the restriction [can]not enlarge the patent
grant,” 141 but reasons, somewhat circularly, that any restriction that is not an
antitrust violation is “generally recognized as within the patent grant.” 142
A. A “Creative Misreading:” Mallinckrodt Favors Licenses
Before considering Mallinckrodt’s impact on SRT, it must be noted that the
Federal Circuit’s subsuming of patent exhaustion in antitrust conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent. Of the decisions finding that a sale of chattel had
exhausted the patentee’s rights, only two cases—Univis Lens 143 and Ethyl
Gasoline 144—conducted full unfair competition analyses. The other cases in the
Adams-to-Quanta line may refer to competition policies, 145 but they do not follow
the elements of any unfair competition cause of action. What is more, the cases

137
Compare Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79805
(E.D. Ky. 2008) with Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
138
At the moment when the Federal Circuit’s undermining of patent exhaustion began, Professor
Wegner cites Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., which held that method patents were not
limited by the exhaustion doctrine. Wegner, supra note 2, at 687 (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s
Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). This rule was directly overturned in Quanta,
which admonished, “[e]liminating exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the
exhaustion doctrine.” Quanta, 553 U.S. at 629.
139
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701, 706 (emphasizing the “[u]se in violation of a valid restriction
may be remedied under the patent law, provided that” the restriction does not “per se violate the
doctrine of patent misuse or the antitrust law” or constitute an antitrust violation under the rule of
reason).
140
Professor Patterson describes the Federal Circuit’s expansion of a patentee’s licensing power
like so: “The Supreme Court says it is ‘reasonably within the reward which the patentee . . . is entitled,’
and the Federal Circuit says ‘reasonably within the patent grant or relates to subject matter within the
scope of the claims.’” (emphasis added). Symposium, supra note 31, at 1030.
141
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703.
142
Id. at 706.
143
United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 243 (1942).
144
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 450–52 (1940).
145
See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917)
(suggesting, in dictum, that patent exhaustion serves a similar purpose as a recently-passed antitrust
statute, because “the effect of [a condition outside the scope of the patent grant] may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce”) (quoting 38 Stat. 730)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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deliberately characterize patent exhaustion as a doctrine independent of the
antitrust and patent misuse laws. Most pointedly, Motion Picture Patents ruled
that a patentee’s sale of film projectors exhausted its right to control what films the
purchaser projects. 146 Though Congress had recently passed an antitrust statute
banning anticompetitive patent licenses, Motion Pictures Patents decided that
“[o]ur conclusion [regarding exhaustion] renders it unnecessary to make the
application of this statute to the case.” 147 Further, the only Supreme Court
exhaustion case to be overturned is Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., which held that
patent exhaustion is found only when the license’s terms are independently
unlawful. 148 The Court has since strongly rebuked this holding, 149 and A.B. Dick’s
overruling was reaffirmed in Quanta. 150 Yet, as commentators point out, the
Federal Circuit’s subsuming of patent exhaustion in antitrust is identical to A.B.
Dick’s discredited ruling. 151 Some take this to mean that Mallinckrodt is now
unreliable precedent. 152 Thus, with Mallinckrodt already on shaky footing, we
turn to that case’s relevance to the Monsanto licenses.
The facts of Mallinckrodt illustrate the deficiency in the Federal Circuit’s
analysis regarding easily replicable patented technology. Mallinckrodt, Inc. was
the patentee and maker of a medical device called the UltraVent, 153 which it sold
to hospitals with a “Single Use Only” label. 154 Disregarding the label, hospitals
began shipping used UltraVents to the defendant, Medipart, Inc., which sterilized
the devices for reuse. 155 Mallinckrodt sued Medipart for infringement on a theory
that Medipart violated the product’s single-use limitation. 156 Mallinckrodt read the
Supreme Court’s caselaw to mean that when a patentee sells its chattel with a
condition, anyone who violates the condition is an infringer. 157 The Court’s
“single use” ruling is what paved the way for Monsanto’s licenses mandating
farmers to destroy second-generation seed. Yet, as illustrated in Part III, the
opinion errs by reading the Court’s use of “unconditional” literally, rather than in
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Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 516, 518.
Id. at 517.
148
Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31 (1912).
149
Motion Picture Patents held, “[i]t is obvious that the conclusions arrived at in this opinion are
such that the decision in Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, must be regarded as overruled.” Motion Picture
Patents, 243 U.S. at 518.
150
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 626 (2008).
151
Leaven, supra note 63, at 131.
152
Hungar considers Quanta to have “eliminate[d] the crucial lynchpin of Mallinckrodt” by
directing courts to consider all exhaustion-policy factors rather than merely the antitrust elements.
Hungar, supra note 121, at 532.
153
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
154
Id. at 701.
155
Id. at 702.
156
Id. at 702–703 (stating that Medipart did not dispute that it received notice of the single-use
labeling restriction).
157
Id. at 706–707 (quoting Keeler, supra note 100, at 666, that “[when a patentee] has . . .
authorized another to construct, sell, and deliver it, or to construct, use, and operate it, without any
conditions, and the consideration has been paid to him for the thing patented” only then are the
patentee’s rights exhausted).
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context of past cases’ facts. Professor Robinson, a supporter of the Mallinckrodt
rule, admits that while the case may be a “creative misreading” of Court precedent,
the Federal Circuit was justified to reject the Court’s past hostility toward post-sale
restrictions. 158 Robinson champions Mallinckrodt for upholding use restrictions
that are economically reasonable, 159 a worthy goal in the abstract. Yet by holding
that sale terms are unreasonable only when they are anticompetitive, the Federal
Circuit allows restraints on alienation and expansions of patent scope that the
Quanta may not have overruled
Supreme Court never envisioned. 160
Mallinckrodt, but, as many diverse commentators agree, Quanta must have
substantially engrossed the universe of chattel servitudes that are considered
“unreasonable.” 161
In addition to its myopic view of unreasonable restraints, Mallinckrodt
skipped an analytic step that should be necessary in SRT cases: the court never
inquired whether Medipart, by sterilizing the UltraVent, was practicing a patent
claim. 162 Professor Patterson points out that a court is obliged to read the
patentee’s claims and rule whether the defendant uses the product in a way more
characteristic of a product maker than a user. 163 Mallinckrodt therefore was
obligated to ask whether the act of sterilizing the UltraVent read on a Mallinckrodt
claim in its entirety, 164 yet analysis does not appear in the opinion. 165 Professor
Robert Gomulkiewicz puzzles at this gap in the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence,
considering that classic exhaustion analysis asks two independent questions:
whether the patentee’s license terms violate some positive law, and whether the
subject matter of the license is limited to the patent’s claims. 166 By focusing only
on the former, the Federal Circuit is overly willing to characterize transfers of SRT
as pure licenses. This approach, illustrated by Monsanto, empowers patentees to
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Robinson, supra note 57, at 1469 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
160
Professor Gomulkiewicz recites the many points at which the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt
precedent has ignored the Supreme Court’s policy of invalidating sale restrictions that hobble the
purchaser’s enjoyment of the product or convert the purchaser into a licensee. Gomulkiewicz, supra
note 51, at 225–29.
161
See Wegner, supra note 2, at 691–692; Gomulkiewicz, supra note 51, at 234; McCammon,
supra note 92, at 795.
162
Symposium, supra note 31, at 1035–36.
163
Professor Patterson cites Jazz Photo as a case where the Federal Circuit did perform this
required added step: in Jazz Photo, “the Federal Circuit said that, in a disposable camera, replacing the
film cartridge after it is used is repair, not reconstruction,” and therefore not an infringement of the
patent. Id. at 1036 (quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
164
This argument evokes the longstanding patent rule that a purchaser has the right to repair the
patent-embodying chattel, so long as that repair is not tantamount to manufacture of a duplicate. Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 (1961). In Aro, the plaintiff owned a
patent for the retracting top on convertible automobiles, while the defendant made and installed
replacement fabric for the same retracting tops. Id. at 337. The Supreme Court ruled that replacing the
fabric on a patented item is not a remanufacture of the item, because the replacement fabric was only
one, unpatented component of the plaintiffs’ combination-of-matter claim. Id. at 344.
165
Mallinckrodt ends the analysis upon a finding that the single-use restriction is not a per se unfair
competition violation and so is enforceable under the patent law. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
976 F.2d 700, 708–09 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
166
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 51, at 228.
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craft licenses that violate the bedrock goals of exhaustion policy. 167
B. Static Control Finds a Pure Sale
The post-Quanta case Static Control v. Lexmark falls on the other end of the
spectrum, finding a conveyance of easily replicable technology a pure sale, with
the purchaser acquiring absolute ownership rights. 168 A district decision, Static
Control opines that “Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt, sub silentio,” 169 and so
reaches the opposite result as Mallinckrodt based on very similar facts. Lexmark
owns certain printer-cartridge patents, which it practices to manufacture the
cartridges. 170 The product is sold with this label attached:
Please read before opening. Opening this package or using the patented cartridge
inside confirms your acceptance of the following license agreement. This patented
Return Program cartridge is sold at a special price subject to a restriction that it may
be used only once. Following this initial use, you agree to return the empty
cartridge only to Lexmark for remanufacturing and recycling. 171

Ignoring the label, many customers shipped empty cartridges to the defendant,
Static Control, for refilling. 172 Static Control’s defense against patent infringement
was that Lexmark’s sale of cartridges to customers was authorized and so
exhausted Lexmark’s patent interest. 173 Citing Quanta, the court agreed, because,
as the District Court explained in a subsequent opinion, “patent rights [in
Lexmark’s cartridges were] exhausted by [their] first sale [to end users].” 174 Just
as Mallinckrodt is over-determined on the issue of replicable technology, Static
Control is under-determined. Professor Patterson chastises the district court for
not asking whether the act of refilling a Lexmark cartridge actually reads on any
Lexmark claims. 175 He argues that if Lexmark’s property includes a cartridgerefilling claim, then the refiller is like a manufacturer, competing with Lexmark in
the primary cartridge market. 176
Furthermore, Lexmark may have had a pro-consumer justification for the
post-sale restriction. Lexmark’s marketing of the cartridges is very similar to the
marketing of vacuum tube amplifiers in General Talking Pictures. There, AT&T
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Hungar, supra note 121, at 530–33.
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79805 (E.D. Ky.
Oct. 3, 2008).
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Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 587 (E.D. Ky.
2009).
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Static Control, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79805 at *11.
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Id. at *13.
172
Id. at *11.
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Id. at *35.
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Id. at *14.
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See generally Symposium, supra note 31, at 1035.
176
Id. at 1035. This would cross the line that courts have erected between mere “repair” of a
purchased product and “reconstruction” of a new product. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961).
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used post-sale restrictions to price-discriminate between two markets, 177 with the
goal of keeping prices low in the private market. 178 Similarly, Lexmark charged
separate prices for its product—lower for single-use cartridges, higher for
unencumbered cartridges. 179 Single-use customers who refilled were thus
enjoying more use than they paid for, and Lexmark’s ability to charge a low price
for once-only users was eroding. 180 However, as Yina Dong points outs, the
district court refused to consider any economic justifications for a post-sale
restriction. 181
The court in Static Control may have reached this uncomfortable result
because the alternative, represented in Mallinckrodt, of allowing licensors to optout of patent exhaustion encourages irresponsible behavior. Some view Static
Control as representing a nascent trend of tolerating chattel servitudes only “so
long as [they] yield social benefits.” 182 This may explain why the court considered
Mallinckrodt no longer good law: 183 the “cost, inconvenience, and annoyance to
the public” of post-transfer restrictions tend to be socially unjustifiable. 184 The
opinion further observes that the exhaustion rule’s roots lie in “the principles of
contract, property, and antitrust.” 185 In this light, the case looks less doctrinaire
and more sensitive to policy considerations; the outcome, then, may have been
different had the court been presented with a licensing option that upheld
exhaustion’s public interest ideals, rather than offending them. For example, what
if instead of suing for damages, Lexmark had sought an injunction under which
Static Control would pay Lexmark a low royalty for refilling the cartridges? I
hope the court would not have rejected the license out of hand but performed a
fact-finding into whether the license would 1) chill Lexmark customers’ freedom
to refill their cartridges, 2) raise overall prices to levels resembling rents, or 3)
extend Lexmark’s power in the retail cartridge market to some other market. 186
Only if any of these factors were triggered would Quanta recommend denying the
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Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179–80 (1938).
See supra text accompanying notes 130–32.
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Static Control, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79805 at *12–13 (quoting the cartridge label as stating,
“[i]f you don’t accept these terms, return the unopened package to your point of purchase. A regular
price cartridge without these terms is available.”).
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Dong, supra note 63, at 56–58.
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economic justifications in Quanta, . . . Lexmark found that all post-sale restrictions on use were
categorically invalid.” Id. at 57.
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Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Innovate After
MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 987 (2009).
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Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 587 (E.D. Ky.
2009).
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Id. at 581 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516
(1917)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Static Control, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 579.
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For its proposition that Mallinckrodt is contrary to the pre-Quanta precedent, Static Control
cites Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 103, 111
n. 35 (2008). Hovenkamp’s research indicates that the early first-sale cases, both in copyright and
patent, tested the validity of post-sale use restrictions on a much broader list of factors than simply the
antitrust elements. Id. at 114.
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injunction. 187 In addition to reflecting exhaustion theory, this tweaking of the
exhaustion rule for SRT is consistent with Tempe Smith’s thesis that failure to
separate a patent-practicing claim from the patent-embodying chattel is an illegal
tying. 188 Still, Smith’s characterization of Monsanto’s two-tiered license as a
Sherman Act violation completely preserves Mallinckrodt, because Smith would
find Monsanto’s conduct independently illegal. 189 Instead, courts should interpret
Quanta as placing the burden on SRT patentees to show exhaustion-theory
reasonableness of post-sale restrictions, rather than requiring SRT purchasers to
show antitrust unreasonableness. 190
C. Monsanto Litigation Has Followed Mallinckrodt—So Far
An approach placing some burden on Monsanto to show exhaustion
reasonableness should have been invoked when the Monsanto licenses were
litigated between 2002 and 2009. The two farmers to challenge the licenses on
exhaustion grounds were Homan McFarling of Missouri 191 and Mitchell Scruggs
of Mississippi. 192 Both had purchased Roundup Ready® seed labeled with the
use-restricting bag tag, and both had ignored the tag and replanted secondgeneration seed. 193 The Federal Circuit heard Mr. McFarling’s case first, before
the Supreme Court delivered Quanta. McFarling urged the Federal Circuit to
follow Univis Lens, claiming that his purchase of seed was an authorized first sale
that extinguished Monsanto’s rights. 194 The Federal Circuit instead held that when
Mr. McFarling purchased the seed, he purchased only the right to plant it for crops,
not the right to manufacture new seeds. 195 Therefore, the bag tag was enforceable
in an infringement action.
Mr. Scruggs met a similar result, as detailed in three separate opinions: one
by the Northern District of Mississippi, 196 the next in the Federal Circuit before

187
Absent those dangers, General Talking Pictures would likely recommend granting the license
under the theory that it preserves the two-market structure that Lexmark devised. Symposium, supra
note 31, at 1034–35.
188
See Smith, supra note 7, at 640.
189
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that patent use
that is not an antitrust violation is “generally recognized as within the patent grant”).
190
See McCammon, supra note 92, at 794.
191
See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
192
See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
193
Mr. McFarling saved soybean seed for the 1999, 2000, and 2001 seasons. McFarling, 302 F.3d
at 1293. Mr. Scruggs purchased 10 acres’ worth of soybean seed and, by seed-saving over several
seasons, realized 8,000 acres’ worth. Mr. Scruggs also saved 2,000 acres’ worth of cotton seeds from
an original purchase of only a few acres’ worth. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
194
McFarling, 302 F. 3d at 1298 (McFarling’s brief cited Univis Lens’ proposition that “when a
patented product has been sold the purchaser acquires ‘the right to use and sell it, and . . . the authorized
sale of an article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent
monopoly with respect to the article sold.’” (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241,
249 (1942))).
195
McFarling, 302 F. 3d at 1299.
196
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
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Quanta, 197 and the third in the Federal Circuit after Quanta. 198 The district court,
citing Mallinckrodt, rejected patent exhaustion because the transfer of seed had
been conditional; 199 the court presumed that conditions placed on chattel were
enforceable, 200 a curious holding since Supreme Court precedent points in
precisely the opposite direction. 201 The Federal Circuit’s opinion two years later
repeated the Mallinckrodt rule but also hinted that Monsanto has a legitimate
business justification for its bag tag license: “The fact that a patented technology
can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of
the technology.” 202 The court seems to intuit that when many farmers are planting
second-generation seeds they collectively become akin to a rival seed
manufacturer. 203 Yet the court makes no distinction between a manufacturer’s
license, which extends strictly to the patent claims, and a license on a user of
chattel, which license strays outside the patent grant and covers seed traits that
Monsanto does not own. 204 After Quanta, Scruggs moved to reconsider the patent
exhaustion issue. The District denied the motion on the grounds that Quanta
examined an unencumbered authorized sale, whereas Monsanto’s seed sales are
not unencumbered. 205 The Federal Circuit denied Scruggs’ interlocutory appeal on
the issue. 206
The Monsanto opinions appear determined to preserve every inch of
Mallinckrodt where SRT is involved, apparently on the theory that SRT innovation
would wither on the vine without maximalist patentee control. 207 In so doing, they
privilege one policy consideration—the patentee’s exclusivity in practicing the
SRT—at the expense of all others, 208 even though Professor First’s research has
questioned whether post-sale patentee rights are even necessary to incentivize
innovation. 209 District courts, though, should be emboldened by Quanta to
scrutinize intensely any SRT license that deprives the user of an ownership interest
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See supra Part III.
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Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336.
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the unfair competition laws is considered within the scope of the patent grant. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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2009).
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in the good. If any alternative licensing scheme would preserve that ownership
interest without causing collateral consumer harm, that scheme should receive
preference. Tempe Smith cites one such example in the Monsanto case. 210 The
existence of this alternative licensing demonstrates that courts need not adopt the
extreme stances of either Mallinckrodt or Static Control, which found
Mallinckrodt per se overruled.
V. SRT IN THE BROADER FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
Finally, a rule that separates self-replicating chattel’s patented traits from its
other traits after a permitted sale would help resolve the discord within the broader
first-sale doctrine. Closely resembling patent exhaustion, the first-sale rule permits
the authorized purchaser of copyright-embodying chattel to alienate that chattel
freely. 211 The paradigmatic first-sale case is Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, where
the copyright owner of a novel sold copies to department stores but forbade the
stores from reselling for less than one dollar. 212 Though a post-sale restriction of
copyright-embodying chattel was an issue of first impression for the Court, 213
Bobbs-Merrill observed that in the patent context, such restrictions had long been
presumed invalid. 214 Ultimately, the Court held that the Copyright Act “do[es] not
create the right to impose . . . a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail
by future purchasers . . . .” 215 Professor John Rothchild’s research indicates that
this origin of the copyright first-sale doctrine was moored less in statutory
construction than in “a common-law aversion to restraints on alienation” of
personal property. 216 The first-sale doctrine is thus an effort to prevent statutory
monopolies from trampling on other, older property rights, an echo of the policies
behind patent exhaustion. In 1979 the amended Copyright Act expressly instated
the Bobbs-Merrill rule. 217
A. The Doctrine’s Discomfort with SRT
A copyrighted work necessarily involves two separate pieces of property: the
chattel, constructed by the manufacturer out of inert material, and the intellectual
property, fixed to the chattel in the form of words or images. 218 As the Fifth
Circuit elegantly described the separation, “a ‘copyright’, together with the
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See Smith, supra note 7, at 640.
See 17 U.S.C.S. § 109(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
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See United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Rothchild, supra note
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exclusive rights and privileges associated with the copyright, does not implicate
any tangible embodiment of the work . . . . [A] copyright is independent of . . . its
Essentially, dominion over the physical
physical manifestation . . . .” 219
embodiment is the purchaser’s right, while the right to make new embodiments
resides with the copyright owner.
However, just as in patent exhaustion, 220 this segregation between IP and
chattel is blurred when courts consider SRT. In copyright, the recurring SRT is
software. Scholars note the analogy between seeds and software: just as software
is “expensive to develop[] and easy to replicate,” 221 seeds are “costly to create, but
nearly costless to duplicate and disperse.” 222 The concern among software
developers is that purchasers of a software-embodying disc will copy the code and
transfer it to another, or to many others through peer-to-peer technology. 223 In
other words, the problem is that the purchaser of SRT can seamlessly transition
from user to cottage manufacturer, competing with the copyright holder during the
copyright term. Such conduct would violate the software publisher’s right to make
copies of the work and to distribute those copies, as provided in 17 U.S.C. §§
106(1) 224 and 106(3). 225 The well-known solution to this problem is a “shrinkwrap” license attached to the box in which the disc is sold, or a “click-wrap”
license, to which an authorized downloader of software agrees in advance of the
download. 226 Almost without exception, shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses
survive first-sale challenges. 227 However, the conditions imposed by such a
license may abrogate purchasers’ rights that are statutorily guaranteed under 17
U.S.C. § 109(a), the codification of the first-sale doctrine, and so open the door to
the same harm to the public interest that Mallinckrodt has enabled in the patent
context.
The courts have done a poor job assessing whether a shrink-wrap license
exerts dominion over more property than the software company owns and, if so,
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Smith, 686 F.2d at 240 (citing United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1966); Local
Trademarks, Inc. v. Price, 170 F.2d 715, 718 (5th Cir. 1948); King Bros. Productions, Inc. v. RKO
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See, e.g., Beard supra note 55, at 20 (explaining that “‘shrink-wrap licenses’ . . . establish
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shrink-wrap licenses.”).
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whether the extension of rights is justified by property or competition policy. 228
Some license conditions properly reflect that a software publisher has rights only
in the software code itself, rather than chattel (the disc) embodying the code. In
Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., the software purchaser had agreed to license terms
forbidding the copying and transferring of software code, which terms are exactly
coextensive with Apple’s statutory rights in its code. 229 License terms, however,
do not stop there, and the courts routinely uphold conditions that control the chattel
itself. 230
Professor Rothchild finds the courts’ blurring between computer programs
and their inert embodiments “puzzling, given that courts have not had the slightest
difficulty distinguishing between the work and the object with respect to other
types of copyrighted works.” 231 One explanation for the confusion is the software
industry’s historically fraught relationship with the IP regimes: makers of early
computer programs, unsure whether their work was protectable by copyright or
patents, required users to enter special agreements theretofore uncommon in the
conveyance of expressive works. 232 Such licensing practices, in one scholar’s
words, have “outlived any doubt about the availability of intellectual property
protection for software;” 233 this phenomenon of covering CDs and online
downloads with licenses may thus beguile judges by their specialness to the
software world. 234 It is equally possible these courts, in granting publishers
control over the chattel, assume the software purchaser first installs the disc onto
his/her computer before effecting the chattel transfer. 235 Where that is the case, the
purchaser’s conduct should create infringement liability, because the copying and
transferring of the disc created two embodiments of copyrighted code where before
there was only one. 236 However, this should be a matter of fact for the court to

228
Professor Winston warns that the delicate balance in IP law between protecting the owner’s
monopoly and protecting the purchaser’s use “is upset by licensing products that embody intellectual
property” and is “shifting . . . away from the public interest.” Winston, supra note 1, at 99.
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Id. at 1474.
234
Rothchild, supra note 56, at 49 (“The answer, it seems to me, must lie in the fact that no other
type of copyrighted work (with the exception of motion pictures) is routinely distributed subject to a
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374 (6th Cir. 2007).
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reproduction).
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explore, not a presumption in all software cases.
If the software purchaser is transferring the disc without first copying it, a
license would not be enforcing the publisher’s § 106 rights; instead, in Professor
Winston’s words, the publisher would be “privately legislating” a copyright
remedy. 237 According to Professor Winston, this manufacture of IP law through
contract is not legitimate: “Licenses may . . . clarify[] what restrictions are being
placed on the chattel,” but they should not “circumvent public legislation by
restricting the downstream use of the chattel in a manner not commensurate with
the scope of” the rights. 238 Professor Daniel Cahoy also balks at the contractual
rewriting of copyright law, concluding that such terms “seem to fly in the face of
important statutory or common law rules . . . .” 239 The common-law principles
that Cahoy and Winston likely have in mind are those that the Supreme Court has
affirmed in its patent-exhaustion rulings: hostility toward running servitudes on
tangible property, suspicion that such servitudes raise prices, and empirical
evidence that most post-sale restrictions are not necessary to spur creation of new
intellectual property. 240
B. Borrowing Reform from Patent Exhaustion
Two authorities propose a reform to courts’ application of the first-sale
doctrine to SRT: Professors Winston and Rothchild argue that courts should
scrutinize the license to determine whether the user is functionally an owner,
defined as one whose property interest in the software is both 1) permanent and 2)
connected to his/her enjoyment rather than manufacture of the good. 241 Rothchild
emphasizes that the traditional IP meaning of a “license” is a “grant of permission”
to exploit the IP commercially, which exploitation is limited in time or scope. 242
Thus, he reasons, a user whose enjoyment of software is not limited in time or
limited to commercial exploitation should be deemed by courts as not a licensee,
regardless of the agreement’s terms. 243
This approach seems almost right. Yet, as in the Static Control opinion,
Rothchild’s and Winston’s willingness to characterize software transfers as pure
sales overlooks the SRT problem—the heightened possibility that a beneficial user,
through his/her use, could become a maker of the product and so cause the IP
owner to lose sales. 244 The line of patent-exhaustion cases that Quanta reaffirmed
provides a model framework for evaluating licenses of copyrighted SRT. My
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theory of these cases’ overarching rule, supported by the literature, is that
conveyance of patent-practicing chattel does create a presumption of exhaustion,
unless a post-conveyance restriction is tailored to a pro-consumer justification. 245
Applied to copyright, the license enforced in Apple v. Psystar should be the default
boundary of a shrink-wrap license’s power to control what a purchaser does with
his/her chattel. 246
At the same time, limitations on software use that serve a pro-consumer
purpose should be upheld; a prime candidate for such exception is the agreement in
Adobe v. Stargate, which licensed the software at an “education” price and so
restricted transfer of the chattel to non-educators. 247 Enforcing the license in an
infringement action, the court noted that Adobe was price-discriminating in order
to maintain two markets—the educational market, which enjoyed a discount, and
the general market, which did not. 248 Adobe, then, is the copyright equivalent of
General Talking Pictures, the only Supreme Court case that did not find patent
exhaustion, where the license preserved a scheme that kept one market’s prices
low. 249 To settle marginal cases in the SRT context, Smith’s proposed structure
for evaluating patent licenses provides a model for more nuanced use-restricting
software licenses, on terms that reflect SRT’s uniqueness. For example, a software
company that offered its product online for download might find that charging one
up-front price deterred low-intensity users from purchasing, and failed to curb
piracy. As a solution, the company could license online use of the software and
“meter” the customer’s intensity of use, charging according to an agreed-on
schedule. A court should find the licensing not barred by the first-sale doctrine,
provided that the payment schedule did not raise overall prices or restrict overall
consumption of the software. 250 Such a rule is roughly analogous to the idea that
Monsanto can sell transgenic seed to farmers and obtain a seasonal technology fee
for every season that the farmers plant second-generation seed; the contract does
not offend the principles of free alienability and the tailoring of IP rights to the
scope of the IP grant. 251
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts considering whether transfers of SRT trigger patent exhaustion
should presume that encumbrances on the end-user’s title offend longstanding
principles, such as the free alienability of movables and the prevention of
inefficient rent-seeking. Only when consumer welfare is endangered by users’
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duplication of a patented good can that use be properly restricted. Therefore, while
patentees of SRT must allow purchasers to take title to goods embodying the
patent, patentees may likewise obtain royalties when purchasers deliberately make
copies of SRT. Furthermore, courts should place the burden on patentees to show
the reasonableness of a use restriction, in terms of patent exhaustion’s social goals,
rather than placing a burden on licensees to prove unreasonableness under unfair
competition law.

